Sampoong Department Store Collapse

Log of the Tragic Day 

Morning of the Collapse (June 29, 1995)

By the morning of June 29, 1995, the Sampoong Department Store in Seocho-gu, Seoul, was already showing critical signs of impending collapse. At 3:00 AM, an on-duty worker observed a ceiling collapse on the 5th floor, with steel beams protruding through, signaling the start of structural failure. This was reported to the facility team leader, who informed executives, only to be instructed to silence security guards and employees.

At 7:30 AM, Kim Seo-jeong, owner of the Chunwon Korean restaurant on the 5th floor, noticed severe structural issues. By 9:00 AM, after confirming a 2 cm floor protrusion and ceiling damage, employees made an emergency call to the facilities team. A 20 cm crack in a 5th-floor pillar and a warped ceiling were discovered, prompting the closure of Chunwon Restaurant by 9:40 AM. By 10:00 AM, photos revealed a "punching shear" phenomenon on the rooftop, with visible floor subsidence and tilted tables in the restaurant area. An employee on the 4th floor reported heavy vibrations and unusual noises from the upper floors.

At 11:00 AM, President Lee Han-sang, Facility Director Lee Young-gil, and Construction Deputy Manager Lee Wan-soo inspected the 5th floor, where water was leaking from the ceilings of restaurants Hyeonji and Mijeon. The floor tilted severely, causing kitchen counters to topple and concrete debris to fall onto food. By noon, the department store contacted Woowon Architecture, halted rooftop air conditioning, and stopped gas supplies to 5th-floor tenants. Ceramics and furniture from the 5th-floor event store were relocated, and the gift certificate store was moved to the 1st-floor lobby. By 12:30 PM, inspections revealed the 5th floor had sunk up to 10 cm, leading to the closure of most 5th-floor stores and the 4th-floor jewelry corner. Cooling tower drainage continued until 2:00 PM.

The shutdown of air conditioners, amid 29°C heat and high humidity, turned the store into a stifling environment, prompting some customers, including comedian Lee Sang-hae and musician Kim Young-im, to leave early, unknowingly escaping disaster.

Countermeasure Meeting and Sales Promotion

At 3:00 PM, structural engineer Lee Hak-soo conducted a safety diagnosis, identifying fist-sized cracks in 5th-floor pillars and floors. At 4:00 PM, a critical meeting in the 3rd-floor executive conference room, chaired by Chairman Lee Jun, included Director Lim Hyeong-jae and Lee Hak-soo. Lim urged immediate evacuation and emergency repairs, citing the flat-plate design’s vulnerabilities. However, Lee Hak-soo downplayed the collapse risk, proposing temporary steel beam reinforcements. Lee Jun, prioritizing economic losses over safety, sided with Lee Hak-soo, rejecting evacuation and opting for repairs without halting operations.

This decision, driven by profit motives, missed a critical window to minimize casualties. Concurrently, the store continued a pre-sale event, illegally inviting customers despite the evident dangers, luring many into the doomed building.

Management’s Presence

Contrary to initial reports, management did not flee before the collapse. They remained in Building B’s conference room, discussing repairs until the disaster struck. Building B’s survival, unlike the collapsed Building A, spared them, but their negligence, ignoring safety for profit, fueled the catastrophe. Chairman Lee Jun’s history of bribing officials, altering designs, and cutting corners, including the reckless relocation of cooling towers, set the stage for the tragedy.

The Collapse

By 5:00 PM, the 4th-floor ceiling began sinking, prompting management to block access to that floor. At 5:30 PM, loud noises emanated from Building A as executives continued discussions. By 5:40 PM, cement fell from the 5th-floor ceiling, and the rooftop floor sank visibly. At 5:47 PM, another loud noise spurred 4th-floor evacuations toward emergency exits and Building B. The emergency bell rang at 5:50 PM, with Manager Lee Young-cheol warning of an imminent collapse.

At 5:51 PM, the 5th floor’s distortion accelerated, with cracks spreading and dust billowing. Employees and customers rushed to emergency exits, but cluttered stairwells, used as storage, hindered escapes. By 5:57 PM, Building A collapsed completely, its floors pancaking from the 5th floor to the 3rd basement, crushing those unable to reach Building B or outside. The collapse, resembling a controlled demolition, was driven by the failure of the 5E support section, exacerbated by poor construction and the cooling towers’ weight.

Immediate Aftermath

The collapse produced a massive dust cloud, covering Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, and Jamsil, with 480 tons of asbestos spreading over 2 km, posing severe respiratory risks. Of the 502 deaths, 396 were women, reflecting the high number of female employees and shoppers. Only 937 survived, with just 40 rescued through efforts; most escaped independently during the chaos. The initial casualty count of 22 dead and 696 injured rose sharply as rescue operations revealed the disaster’s scale.

Building B, though intact, was deemed unsafe and demolished by January 1999. The collapse, initially mistaken for a terrorist attack or gas explosion, was confirmed as a result of poor construction, shocking experts and the public. Media coverage by KBS, SBS, and MBC captured the devastation, with reporters like MBC’s Kim Eun-hye risking their safety to retrieve blueprints, confirming the structural failures.

Theft Amid Chaos

In the absence of immediate control, looters exploited the chaos, raiding Building B’s cash registers and victims’ belongings. CCTV and news footage captured individuals, including a woman infamously dubbed the “Devil’s Smile,” stealing amidst the rubble. Seocho Police Station reported 400 theft cases, with one individual caught wearing multiple stolen pants, claiming it was due to the “cold” despite the 29°C heat.

Impact and Casualties

The disaster claimed prominent victims, including relatives of Samsung, LG, Daewoo, and Hyundai executives, as well as legal professionals’ families. The high casualty rate among employees (306, including 221 dispatched workers) reflected their inability to abandon posts despite warnings. The tragedy, compounded by asbestos exposure, underscored systemic safety failures, leaving a lasting scar on South Korea’s collective memory.

Rescue Operations

Inefficient Rescue Efforts

The collapse of Sampoong Department Store on June 29, 1995, exposed South Korea’s unpreparedness for large-scale disasters. Lacking a systematic rescue framework, the response was chaotic and inefficient. No established manual existed for such emergencies, and prior large-scale accidents had not prompted adequate improvements in response systems.

A multitude of groups, including the fire department, police, Army Capital Defense Command, Army Special Warfare Command, local residents, civilian volunteers, Marine Corps veterans, the Salvation Army, and US Army personnel in Korea, converged on the site. However, jurisdictional disputes among the fire department, police, Seoul City, and Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters hindered coordination. The Blue House eventually designated the fire department as the lead, but conflicts persisted among organizations, bereaved families, and volunteers, leading to a disorganized rescue effort. The absence of pre-secured equipment, such as cutting machines, further delayed operations.

Challenges at the Scene

A fire, sparked by automobile engine oil and gasoline, erupted at the site on the day of the collapse. With water supply lines severed, outdoor fire hydrants were inoperable, delaying firefighting efforts. The leaning elevator tower on the north side of the collapsed Building A necessitated a pause in rescue operations to install H-beams for safety, further slowing progress. After 52 hours, 24 sanitation workers were rescued, but the operation faced significant hurdles.

Firefighters sprayed water to extinguish fires, provide drinking water to trapped survivors, and manage heat in the 29°C summer conditions. However, this had mixed outcomes. Survivor Lee Eun-young, rescued after 70 hours from the first basement, suffered severe burns and a ruptured eye, dying during transport. Another survivor drowned in water sprayed by rescuers, while others, like Yoo Ji-hwan, Choi Myeong-seok, and Park Seung-hyeon, survived partly due to the water, echoing the 1967 Cheongyang tunnel collapse survivor Yang Chang-shin’s account of surviving 16 days by drinking water.

Controversial Rescue Methods

Debate arose over using forklifts and excavators due to risks of harming survivors. However, with rescue workers monitoring closely, no such incidents occurred. Choi Myeong-seok was discovered during escalator dismantling by an excavator. The US military airlifted STOLS sound-based rescue equipment from Hawaii, but ambient noise rendered it ineffective. Borehole cameras (5 cm diameter) were deployed, yet failed to locate survivors. Rescue operations were briefly halted to call missing persons’ beeper numbers, but this yielded no results.

Administrative Failures

The Seoul Metropolitan Government initially underestimated the missing at 200, later revising to 400, revealing poor record-keeping. Bereaved families protested the mishandling of remains, as bodies were dismembered and mixed with debris, some even dumped in the Nanjido landfill, requiring a later search to recover 142 additional bodies. The authorities’ method of counting body parts (2 arms + 2 legs + head + torso = 1 body) fueled public outrage.

Volunteers, including 50 special forces, civilians, and bereaved families, purchased cutting machines independently, but the command center restricted their access, prioritizing professional rescuers after incidents of theft by individuals posing as volunteers. Approximately 400 people were arrested for looting, including those stealing from Building B’s cash registers and victims’ belongings.

Community and Corporate Support

Despite the chaos, acts of solidarity emerged. Soldiers donated blood, the Sampoong gas station provided its office as a rescue headquarters, and local women’s associations distributed food. Hyundai Department Store dispatched 30–50 employees to provide coffee and ramen, while comedian Jo Jeong-hyun and his buffet staff volunteered. A foreign hotel supplied meals, welders brought tools, a company installed lighting, and nuns offered first aid. Merchants provided hundreds of raincoats to volunteers.

The US, Russia, and France offered rescue teams, but South Korea declined, relying on local efforts and limited US military support with sonar equipment. The National Institute of Scientific Investigation used DNA identification, a novel technique at the time, collecting blood from 150 family members to identify remains, many of which were severely damaged or unrecoverable.

Notable Survivors

• Yu Ji-hwan (female, 18 at the time, rescued after 13 days): Trapped in the first basement, she survived by talking to fellow employees, though she was the only one to live. Post-rescue, she expressed a light-hearted desire to “drink iced coffee” and later shared her story on The Story of That Day (2021).
• Choi Myeong-seok (male, 20 at the time, rescued after 11 days): A non-regular worker, he survived by drinking rainwater during a downpour. Discovered during escalator dismantling, he received Coca-Cola and job support from Doosan and LG. He later married survivor Park Seung-hyun and works at GS Construction.
• Park Seung-hyeon (female, 19 at the time, rescued after 17 days): The last survivor, she set a South Korean record for surviving 377 hours in isolation. Specially recruited by the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service, she resigned in 2000 due to contract changes during the IMF crisis.