as if I have very high respect for assholes who don't know how to take different opinions than others. if it's mediocre, I will call it mediocre. you can just fuck off đź–•đź–•.
then put that opinion in ur ass, bcz whatever I said was about drama, I didn't go to some other random person's comment nd said anything to him in the name of "I have an opinion too".
This platform is for all kind of opinions, so why did u assume ppl will not have different opinion than urs?? why do u think everyone is here for seeking attention?? or maybe bcz u do the same everywhere on MDL, that's why u think others are also same?? & how about you ignore my comment nd mind ur business, than getting worked upon simple opinion of some random person.
and who are u to tell me drop the show?? its upto me whether I want to drop or not. so if someone criticise show they had to drop and only fans who praise show 24*7 are allowed to watch the drama or what??
Rage baiting is not a good hobby. Have you tried crochet?
what will I even get by rage baiting here?? its not X bro, neither im gonna get any money by rage baiting ppl here. just accept ppl can have different opinions.
so I'm not allowed to watch show?? I find it average, I don't find it that bad that i want to drop show but still to me ratings are so high for this mediocrity.
Then answer is NO. In manhwa ML's uncle raised MC, he was orphan but ML's cousin and aunt thought he was illegitimate son of uncle so they treated him poorly. In manhwa if I'm not wrong cousins used to beat MC really badly & I think they also used to sexually assault him.
No, in manhwa they were never real cousins, ML's uncle raised MC, he was orphan but uncle's wife and kids always thought MC is illegitimate son of uncle so they treated him poorly.
The way doha acts like little cute girl who doesn't have knowledge about how world works is so funny nd cliche to watch. But nonetheless show is so fun to watch.
Man, this was plain bad. The main couple had zero chemistry, both were dull and lacked the spark you would expect from leads. The actors themselves didnt have the charisma to make their characters engaging. The only saving grace was the second couple, but even they were robbed of a proper ending. Their storyline felt rushed and empty.
5/10, and that’s purely for the second couple, especially Jigwi.
I find myself liking the second couple far more than the main leads. They have such great chemistry that i cant help but want to see more of them. Jigwi is so charismatic, every time he appears on screen, he completely steals the spotlight. And the actor playing Gildal reminds me so much of Kim Jung hyun, his expressions, mannerisms and even his voice are strikingly similar. I would absolutely love to see these two cast as the main lead couple in another drama.
That new guy who was playing kuroki keita, i really loved his screen presence even tho it screams love rivalary. Would love to see him to do main role in future BLs.
That’s a really unfair generalization. Not all Muslims ignore these issues infact many openly speak out against…
Claiming that the Quran or Islamic law institutionalized restraint ignores how classical scholars themselves interpreted these verses. Yes, texts like “Fight only those who fight you” exist, but later surahs particularly 9:5, the so-called Sword Verse were treated under the doctrine of abrogation (naskh), which classical jurists explicitly recognized as overriding earlier peaceful commands. Scholars like Ibn Kathir, Al-Tabari, and Al-Shawkani explained that these verses set enduring principles for warfare and the treatment of non Muslims not temporary, isolated events.
It is misleading to cite protections for non combatants or truces as proof of universal restraint. Classical jurisprudence codified rules for jihad, punishment of apostates, and jizya, all based directly on Quranic text and prophetic traditions. Peace and negotiation were permitted only under conditions favorable to Islamic authority; they were never guaranteed as a principle of equality or freedom of belief.
Finally, framing the Sword Verse as “about a specific conflict” ignores how later empires and jurists applied it universally, using it to justify military campaigns, expansion, and legal penalties. The historical record shows that abrogation and selective application made these verses foundational, not incidental, contrary to claims that restraint was the Quran’s overriding principle.
Claiming that “aggression did not include disbelief” is technically accurate only on paper. Classical jurists tied apostasy punishment to rebellion or political threat, but public renunciation of Islam was frequently treated as treason, giving authorities legal cover to enforce lethal consequences. This wasn’t limited to one region or century, modern states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan still criminalize apostasy or blasphemy, applying penalties rooted directly in these classical interpretations.
The argument that executions were rare historically ignores the structural power the law gave rulers and judges. Hadiths such as “Whoever changes his religion, kill him” (Sahih al-Bukhari 3017) were codified into all major schools, and requirements like adulthood, sanity, and publicity were procedural conditions not barriers preventing the state from punishing dissent. In modern practice, authorities can still use these laws to target perceived threats to social or religious order, even if not every case ends in execution.
Even if jurists restricted punishment to treason during wartime, this framework blurs the line between private belief and political threat, making apostasy and dissent legally precarious. The absence of mass executions historically reflects practical enforcement limits, not a doctrinal refusal to punish disbelief. Today, those same principles underpin laws that curtail religious freedom, limit conversion, and criminalize criticism, showing that this is not merely a relic of the past.
Claiming the Quran’s model for blasphemy is purely verbal ignores how jurists and states codified punitive measures over time. While the Qur’an itself often advocates patience or verbal response to mockery, classical fiqh interpreted certain hadiths and prophetic practices as mandating corporal or capital punishment for blasphemy in specific circumstances. Historically, this led to executions or imprisonment in many regions from the early caliphates to the Ottoman Empire. In modern times, countries like Pakistan, Iran continue to enforce blasphemy laws, often with severe penalties, showing that the textual framework still carries real legal and social force, not just abstract guidance.
As for jizya and the dhimmi system, portraying it as a simple tax and protection arrangement is an oversimplification. Yes, dhimmis were exempt from military service and technically received protection, but they were second class citizens, restricted in public office, subject to special legal codes, and often pressured socially and economically to convert. Jizya rates varied and could be punitive; in some periods and regions, refusal to pay led to imprisonment or worse. While the system differed from outright massacres or slavery, it was institutionalized inequality based on religion, not parity.
Modern references reinforce this legacy: although most contemporary Muslim majority countries no longer levy jizya formally, some legal frameworks, social expectations, or laws regarding conversion, inheritance, or religious status echo those hierarchies, showing that dhimmi principles were not purely historical abstractions. Treating it as just a civic tax ignores the embedded legal and social distinctions that historically and sometimes presently privileged Muslims over non Muslims.
Saying “other religions also had coercion, and politics caused reforms” is true but misleading when comparing outcomes. Christianity and Judaism may have enforced harsh penalties for apostasy in the past, but those punishments were abandoned entirely for centuries, and today no Christian majority or Jewish majority state enforces execution for leaving the faith. In contrast, Islamic apostasy and blasphemy laws remain codified in multiple modern states, Saudi, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and continue to produce real legal consequences. The claim that reforms in Muslim countries erase this fact ignores that these laws are still enforceable and politically active, even if occasionally dormant.
Regarding moderates and extremists, claiming “most peaceful Muslims are silent and shouldn’t be blamed” sidesteps structural and social realities. In many Muslim-majority countries, ordinary citizens do speak against extremism but social pressure, legal restrictions, and state enforcement of Sharia-based rules mean that moderation often has limited public visibility or impact. When laws criminalize apostasy, restrict freedom of religion, or empower religious police, it is not simply “authoritarian politics”, it is religion institutionalized into governance, making moderation practically constrained. Comparing this to civilians in Russia or China misrepresents the difference: the legal and religious framework in some Islamic states directly supports punishment for belief or speech, unlike secular governments where dissent is political but not theological.
In short, moderates exist, but structural and textual realities empower coercion, giving extremists and state enforcers a disproportionate influence over how Islam is interpreted and applied today. Claiming this is just media bias ignores the enduring legal and social systems that perpetuate inequality and enforcement based on religion.
The claim that “non Muslims survived for centuries in Muslim lands” is just laughworthy repeated without context. Survival is not the same as equality. Yes, Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and other minorities existed but almost always as second class citizens under the dhimmi system, barred from high office, restricted in worship, taxed specifically for their faith and at constant risk of mob or state violence. Historical endurance does not erase institutional subjugation.
The Quran may say “no compulsion in religion,” yet the implementation across centuries and modern times shows persistent coercion, legal, social, and demographic. Look at Pakistan, where the Hindu population has fallen from 15% at independence to under 2% today, with regular forced conversions and blasphemy charges. In Bangladesh, the Hindu population dropped from 22% to less than 8%, largely through persecution, displacement, and targeted violence. In Egypt, Coptic Christians face systemic discrimination from church restrictions to exclusion in government jobs while blasphemy accusations can destroy lives overnight. In Turkey a nation once home to over 2 million Christians before 1915, today has fewer than 100,000, a demographic collapse driven by expulsions, massacres, and cultural erasure. In Iran, the Baha’i community, peaceful and apolitical remains officially unrecognized, barred from universities and government posts.
If “Islamic law separates belief from violence,” then why do modern blasphemy and apostasy laws still carry death or life imprisonment sentences? Why are people like Asia Bibi, Mubarak Bala, and Mashal Khan punished, imprisoned, or lynched for expression or belief? These are not isolated incidents, they stem from the same legal and theological framework that once justified coercion in the name of faith.
Meanwhile, Muslim minorities in secular or non Muslim nations from India to Western Europe not only survive but thrive with full citizenship rights and religious freedom, protected by law. Contrast that with near total erasure of Hindu, Christian and Jewish populations in many Muslim majority countries that once had them. That is not organic social change, its a clear pattern of religious cleansing over time driven by doctrine, law and power.
So yes, other religions had coercive histories but most outgrew them centuries ago. Islam’s problem is not its scripture alone, but the continued integration of medieval jurisprudence into modern governance, ensuring that coercion remains codified, not condemned. The "no compulsion in religion" verse may be recited often but its practice is still the exception, not the rule.
Oh, you can go on and on with your context lectures but trust me nothing’s changing my perception. We have all seen just how peaceful your religion is. Terrorism tends to make a stronger statement than your sugarcoated explanations. But sure, keep the PR campaign going.
Then answer is NO. In manhwa ML's uncle raised MC, he was orphan but ML's cousin and aunt thought he was illegitimate son of uncle so they treated him poorly. In manhwa if I'm not wrong cousins used to beat MC really badly & I think they also used to sexually assault him.
5/10, and that’s purely for the second couple, especially Jigwi.
It is misleading to cite protections for non combatants or truces as proof of universal restraint. Classical jurisprudence codified rules for jihad, punishment of apostates, and jizya, all based directly on Quranic text and prophetic traditions. Peace and negotiation were permitted only under conditions favorable to Islamic authority; they were never guaranteed as a principle of equality or freedom of belief.
Finally, framing the Sword Verse as “about a specific conflict” ignores how later empires and jurists applied it universally, using it to justify military campaigns, expansion, and legal penalties. The historical record shows that abrogation and selective application made these verses foundational, not incidental, contrary to claims that restraint was the Quran’s overriding principle.
Claiming that “aggression did not include disbelief” is technically accurate only on paper. Classical jurists tied apostasy punishment to rebellion or political threat, but public renunciation of Islam was frequently treated as treason, giving authorities legal cover to enforce lethal consequences. This wasn’t limited to one region or century, modern states like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan still criminalize apostasy or blasphemy, applying penalties rooted directly in these classical interpretations.
The argument that executions were rare historically ignores the structural power the law gave rulers and judges. Hadiths such as “Whoever changes his religion, kill him” (Sahih al-Bukhari 3017) were codified into all major schools, and requirements like adulthood, sanity, and publicity were procedural conditions not barriers preventing the state from punishing dissent. In modern practice, authorities can still use these laws to target perceived threats to social or religious order, even if not every case ends in execution.
Even if jurists restricted punishment to treason during wartime, this framework blurs the line between private belief and political threat, making apostasy and dissent legally precarious. The absence of mass executions historically reflects practical enforcement limits, not a doctrinal refusal to punish disbelief. Today, those same principles underpin laws that curtail religious freedom, limit conversion, and criminalize criticism, showing that this is not merely a relic of the past.
Claiming the Quran’s model for blasphemy is purely verbal ignores how jurists and states codified punitive measures over time. While the Qur’an itself often advocates patience or verbal response to mockery, classical fiqh interpreted certain hadiths and prophetic practices as mandating corporal or capital punishment for blasphemy in specific circumstances. Historically, this led to executions or imprisonment in many regions from the early caliphates to the Ottoman Empire. In modern times, countries like Pakistan, Iran continue to enforce blasphemy laws, often with severe penalties, showing that the textual framework still carries real legal and social force, not just abstract guidance.
As for jizya and the dhimmi system, portraying it as a simple tax and protection arrangement is an oversimplification. Yes, dhimmis were exempt from military service and technically received protection, but they were second class citizens, restricted in public office, subject to special legal codes, and often pressured socially and economically to convert. Jizya rates varied and could be punitive; in some periods and regions, refusal to pay led to imprisonment or worse. While the system differed from outright massacres or slavery, it was institutionalized inequality based on religion, not parity.
Modern references reinforce this legacy: although most contemporary Muslim majority countries no longer levy jizya formally, some legal frameworks, social expectations, or laws regarding conversion, inheritance, or religious status echo those hierarchies, showing that dhimmi principles were not purely historical abstractions. Treating it as just a civic tax ignores the embedded legal and social distinctions that historically and sometimes presently privileged Muslims over non Muslims.
Saying “other religions also had coercion, and politics caused reforms” is true but misleading when comparing outcomes. Christianity and Judaism may have enforced harsh penalties for apostasy in the past, but those punishments were abandoned entirely for centuries, and today no Christian majority or Jewish majority state enforces execution for leaving the faith. In contrast, Islamic apostasy and blasphemy laws remain codified in multiple modern states, Saudi, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and continue to produce real legal consequences. The claim that reforms in Muslim countries erase this fact ignores that these laws are still enforceable and politically active, even if occasionally dormant.
Regarding moderates and extremists, claiming “most peaceful Muslims are silent and shouldn’t be blamed” sidesteps structural and social realities. In many Muslim-majority countries, ordinary citizens do speak against extremism but social pressure, legal restrictions, and state enforcement of Sharia-based rules mean that moderation often has limited public visibility or impact. When laws criminalize apostasy, restrict freedom of religion, or empower religious police, it is not simply “authoritarian politics”, it is religion institutionalized into governance, making moderation practically constrained. Comparing this to civilians in Russia or China misrepresents the difference: the legal and religious framework in some Islamic states directly supports punishment for belief or speech, unlike secular governments where dissent is political but not theological.
In short, moderates exist, but structural and textual realities empower coercion, giving extremists and state enforcers a disproportionate influence over how Islam is interpreted and applied today. Claiming this is just media bias ignores the enduring legal and social systems that perpetuate inequality and enforcement based on religion.
The claim that “non Muslims survived for centuries in Muslim lands” is just laughworthy repeated without context. Survival is not the same as equality. Yes, Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and other minorities existed but almost always as second class citizens under the dhimmi system, barred from high office, restricted in worship, taxed specifically for their faith and at constant risk of mob or state violence. Historical endurance does not erase institutional subjugation.
The Quran may say “no compulsion in religion,” yet the implementation across centuries and modern times shows persistent coercion, legal, social, and demographic. Look at Pakistan, where the Hindu population has fallen from 15% at independence to under 2% today, with regular forced conversions and blasphemy charges. In Bangladesh, the Hindu population dropped from 22% to less than 8%, largely through persecution, displacement, and targeted violence. In Egypt, Coptic Christians face systemic discrimination from church restrictions to exclusion in government jobs while blasphemy accusations can destroy lives overnight. In Turkey a nation once home to over 2 million Christians before 1915, today has fewer than 100,000, a demographic collapse driven by expulsions, massacres, and cultural erasure. In Iran, the Baha’i community, peaceful and apolitical remains officially unrecognized, barred from universities and government posts.
If “Islamic law separates belief from violence,” then why do modern blasphemy and apostasy laws still carry death or life imprisonment sentences? Why are people like Asia Bibi, Mubarak Bala, and Mashal Khan punished, imprisoned, or lynched for expression or belief? These are not isolated incidents, they stem from the same legal and theological framework that once justified coercion in the name of faith.
Meanwhile, Muslim minorities in secular or non Muslim nations from India to Western Europe not only survive but thrive with full citizenship rights and religious freedom, protected by law. Contrast that with near total erasure of Hindu, Christian and Jewish populations in many Muslim majority countries that once had them. That is not organic social change, its a clear pattern of religious cleansing over time driven by doctrine, law and power.
So yes, other religions had coercive histories but most outgrew them centuries ago. Islam’s problem is not its scripture alone, but the continued integration of medieval jurisprudence into modern governance, ensuring that coercion remains codified, not condemned. The "no compulsion in religion" verse may be recited often but its practice is still the exception, not the rule.
Oh, you can go on and on with your context lectures but trust me nothing’s changing my perception. We have all seen just how peaceful your religion is. Terrorism tends to make a stronger statement than your sugarcoated explanations. But sure, keep the PR campaign going.